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NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs-Appellants sought to quiet title to six
(6) acres of property which they previously acquired from
Davis County on an invalid tax sale.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judge Calvin Gould, after considering the extensive
briefs that were filed by the parties, granted the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on March 3, 1983.

The

Final Order referred to in Appellants' brief was prepared,
but was never submitted to the Trial Court.

Appellants'

attorney filed the Notice of Appeal (R. 261, 262 Dated March
31, 1983), with the District Court, but failed to send Respondents a copy.

The first Notice the Respondent, Utah De-

partment of Transportation, had of the pending appeal came
with the Appellants' Designation of the Record which occurred on April 8, 1983.

(R. 266,267)

The Respondent,

thinking the appeal time expired on April 3, 1983, prepared
the Final Order (Appendix A) and sent it to Appellant, but
in the meantime received the Designation of the Record, and
consequently did not submit the Final Order to the Court for
execution.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents, Utah Department of Transportation,
Weber and Davis Counties seek to have this Court affirm a
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Summary Judgment which was granted in their favor which
quieted title to twelve

(12) acres of landlocked property

which was determined to be located in Weber County, State of
Utah.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
These Respondents disagree in part with Appellants'
Statement of Facts and therefore,

restates the same.

The

Appellants' statement contains legal argument, wrong citations and statements in the form of argument without any
reference to the record where such facts appear.
Just prior to May 25, 1964, the Third-Party Defendant,
Robert Dansie (he was a Utah attorney who is now deceased),
hereinafter referred to as "Dansie," was the owner of approximately 24.41 acres located near Uintah Junction where
the Weber River intersects with U.S. Highway 89.

The

property in question, according to the Davis County plat
maps, was located north of the existing Weber River.

(R.

18)
In May of 1964, the Defendant-Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation, purchased the property in question
by right-of-way contract

(R. 99), and warranty deed from the

Third-Party Defendant, Robert Dansie.
98)

(R. 98)

The deed

(R.

was recorded in Davis County on June 17, 1964, but Davis

County only recognized,

for

recordation purposes, the
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description in the deed which followed the portion of property which was designated "also in Davis County."

This par-

ticular description involved a small tract of property which
in fact, was situated south of the Weber River.

The deed in

question was then later sent to weber County for recordation.

The deed was held by Weber County until September of

1970, when it finally received a recordation seal.
The taxes on the property in question were not paid for
the years of 1964 through 196B in Davis County and consequently, came up for tax sale in May of 1969.

(R. 85)

Ap-

parently, both Davis and Weber County had been each taxing
the same property.

The parties who purchased the property

at the May, 1969 tax sale (R. 100), were Thomas Holberg [Rio
Vista, Involuntary Plaintiff, that default judgment was
entered against

(R. 255, 256)], Ronald Baxter

Appellant) and Ronald Toone,
R. 47.)

(Plaintiff in Civil No. 20915,

Mr. Baxter (Plaintiff-Appellant)

engineer for the Respondent

(Plaintiff-

is currently an

(Utah Department of Transporta-

tion) and was also, at the time he purchased at tax sale the
property, his employer, the Utah Department of Transportation, Respondent, had previously purchased from Dansie.

The

facts appear to be that Davis County probably sent tax and
sale notices to Dansie for the years in question,

but the

Respondent Utah Department of Transportation cid not receive
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any such notices.

Dansie, since he had previously sold the

property, disregarded the tax notices from Davis County.
(R. 85) Weber County did not attempt to assess taxes on the
property in question since they recognized the Respondent,
Utah Department of Transportation, as the lawful owner of
the property in question.
The tax sale purchasers, Holberg (Involuntary Plaintiff), Baxter (Plaintiff-Appellant) and Toone (Plaintiff in
Civil No. 20915), then divided the property, each taking six
(6) acres and paid taxes to Davis County until 1978.

(R.

113-117)
In January of 1975, the Defendant-Respondent then
notified the tax sale purchasers and Davis County of the
foregoing tax sale and its invalidity.

(R. 101-104)

In August of 1975, a contractor for the Respondent,
Utah Department of Transportation, LeGrande Johnson Construction Company, entered upon a portion of the 18 acres
in question and set up a gravel crushing operation.

Shortly

thereafter, one of the tax sale purchasers, Ronald Toone, in
Civil No. 20915 in Davis County, commenced a damage action
against LeGrande Johnson Construction Company.
The foregoing action in Civil No. 20915, resulted in a
Judgment against the Plaintiff on December 13, 1976.
106, 107)

(R.

The Plaintiff, Toone, was represented by Mr. Glen
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E. Fuller, the same attorney who is now representing the
current Plaintiffs-Appellants.

(R. 106, 107)

The Trial

Court found that the property in question was not located in
Davis county and therefore, was improperly assessed and sold
at tax sale.

(R. 106, 107)

Further, the

case was

tried on the basis of the location of the Weber at the time
of Statehood.

The jury concluded that the Weber River had

not changed since 1896, which was the critical time for
determining the boundary line
and Weber County.

(Weber River), between Davis

At least 10 maps were shown to the jury

from 1892 to the present time which established the location
of the Weber River.

Mr. Fuller attempted by parol evidence

to dispute the 10 maps in question.
recorded in Davis County.
dency of the

The Judgment was then

(R. 106, 107)

During the pen-

action, a Motion to Join the other tax

sale purchasers (Toone and Holberg) was made to the Court
which the Plaintiffs opposed and the Court denied.
As a result of the

(R.

49)

Judgment, Davis County then

abated and refunded the taxes which the Plaintiffs-Appellants in the present action, had previously paid.
109)

(R. 108,

The Respondent Davis County also marked their plats

and tax records reflecting that the entire 18 acres in
question were located in Weber County.

( R.

110)

Since 1972

to the present, none of the three tax sale purchasers have
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paid taxes on the 18 acres in question and Davis County has
neither assessed the 18 acres in question nor accepted any
taxes with respect to it.

The current Plaintiff-Appel-

lant, Ronald Baxter, testified as an interested witness on
behalf of the Plaintiff, Toone,
20915.

in the Trial of Civil No,

Mr. Baxter was definitely interested in the outcome

of the .IQQn.e. case, since his property was located on its
east boundary.

(R. 251)

The current Plaintiffs in Civil No. 74206, filed their
Notice of Claim in May of 1978 (R. 111, 112), and their
Complaint in May of 1979 (R. 1, 2
Court of Davis County.

&

3), in the District

The Davis County Court then granted

the Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation's Motion
for a Change of Venue to Weber County.

(R. 33, 34, 35, 36)

The Davis District Court presumptively ruled that the propperty in question was shown to be in Weber County.

After

the case was removed to Weber County, the Defendant-Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation, then filed its
Answer and Third-Party Complaint.
The present Plaintiffs-Appellants feel they should be
allowed to retry the issue of the location of the WeberDa\'is County line.

The six

(6)

acres which was conveyed to

the Appellants lies immediately east of the six (6) acres
which was involved in the

case and just west of the
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six (6) acres which Rio Vista (Thomas Holberg) acquired, and
allowed default judgment to be entered against.

(P.. 255,

256) It must be noted that the entire 18 acres in question
lies north of the Weber River and is bordered on the west
and north by the Defendant-Respondent's freeway.

The entire

18 acres is both Fhysically and legally landlocked.

The

location of the Weber River determined the boundary between
the two counties.

Since the Plaintiffs-Appellants' property

lies north of the existing Weber River and depends upon a
tax sale from Davis County, the issue of the legality of the
original tax sale has already been determined.

The Plain-

tiffs-Appellants feel that 1896 should not be the critical
time for the determination of the location of the WeberDavis County line, but rather the date should be 1866.
Mr.

Fuller felt the Trial Court in

If

case erron-

eously used 1896, rather than 1866 as the year to determine
the location of the boundary between Davis and Weber County,
he should have appealed the decision rendered in the
case.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants have to accept the fore-

going since the evidence is so overwhelming in favor of
where the Weber-Davis County line (Weber River) was in 1896.
It must also be noted that Mr. Fuller in the
filed a Motion for New Trial alleging that 1866 should be
the critical date instead of 1896.
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The Trial Court Judge

Gould, denied the Motion.
Judge Gould (\>;ho was the same Judge who tried the
quiet title action) then required that Weber County and the
remaining tax sale purchaser, Rio Vista Oil Ltd.,

(Company

owned by Holberg) be joined in the present action.
199)

(R.

198,

Both Respondents, Weber and Davis County, now join in

requesting this Court to affirm the Lower Court's decision.
Weber County filed an answer alleging it wanted nothing to
do with the present action.

226, 227, 228)

(R.

Rio Vista

failed to file any type of responsive pleading and default
judgment was then entered.

(R.

255, 256)

The Defendant-Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in its favor
upon the ground and for the reason that no genuine issue of
fact remains to be decided and therefore, Judgment should be
granted in its favor as a matter of law.

(R. 84)

The Trial

Court then granted the Defendant-Respondent, Utah Department
of Transportation's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 249,

250, 251, 252, 258, 259)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT FOLLOWED PROPER PROCEDURES IN
GRANTING OF THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
lt appears that Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel has in

-9-

his arguments attempted to cite all the criteria that
should be followed in determining when a party should be
granted a Summary Judgment, but then failed to state what
facts were in dispute.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure states the following:
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the m9ving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel is very skillful in accusing Defendants-Respondents' counsel of only quotins and
using these facts and documents which support their position.

At all times during the proceedings of the two cases,

Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel has been afforded every opportunity to object to any facts and/or documents which
were inadmissable or irrelevent and therefore, should not
have been considered by the Trial Court.

Defendants-Respon-

dents can only submit to this Court that the only real objection to the documents and facts used are that PlaintiffsAppellants' counsel feels the facts and documents are detrimental to his clients case, but cannot legally keep the documents from consideration by this Court.
On Page 11 of their Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants cite
an excerpt from a transcript of one of the hearings and
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the page as 268.

The quote is actually containea on page

274, and came as a result of a hearing wherein PlaintiffsAppellants' counsel attempted to cite facts to the Trial
Court as reasons for allowing an adjoining landowner (Monroe) to intervene in the present lawsuit, when they had
nothing whatsoever to do with the present lawsuit and with
Plaintiffs-Appellants invalid tax title.
Court will read the transcript

(R.

(R. 281)

If this

268-286), it will be

readily apparent that the disparity existed in the facts as
they relate to whether Plaintiffs-Appellants should be
allowed to have an adjoining landowner (Monroe)
the present action.

intervene in

The facts that Plaintiffs-Appellants

are attempting to have this Court believe existed with respect to Monroe, do not pertain to the facts as exist in
the present action.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel cites only a portion cf
this Court's decision in Schaer y, UDOT.
10, 1983).

(No. 18009 January

The end of the quote reads as follows:

Where
the materials presented by
the moving party are sufficient to entitle
hire to a directed verdict [as a matter of law]
and the opposing party fails either to offer
counter-affidavits or other materials that raise
a credible issue [of fact] or to show that he
has evidence not then available, summary judgment may be rendered for the moving party.
The Court in the Schaer case upheld the Trial court's
granting of the Summary Judgment because its ruling was sup-11-

ported by uncontroverted facts.
Plaintiffs-Appellants (on Page 13 of their Brief) cite
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Evidence that the Judge " •..
afford each party reasonable opportunity to present to him
information relative to the propriety of taking judicial
notice of a matter or to the tenor of the matter to be
noticed."
Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel was the attorney of
record in the case of Toone y. LeGrande Johnson (Civil No.
20915) and therefore, was intimately familiar with its
contents.

What Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel fails to cite

are the facts which he feels the Trial Court erroneously
found to exist or judicially noticed which he now disputes.
Whether Monroe, as noted above, should have been joined in
this lawsuit has nothing whatsoever to do with the issues
raised by this proceeding, i.e., whether the Davis County
tax sale was valid or not.

Monroe's chain of title had

nothing whatsoever to de with the tax sale in question.

(R.

268-286)
Any claims of the Plaintiffs-Appellants that deal with
Defendant-Respondent Weber County should be summarily
posed of, since they have joined in as a Respondent in the
present appeal.

It is, therefore,

fer Plain-

tiffs-Appellants to attempt to raise issues that sclEly Le-
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long to the Respondent, Weber County.
POINT II
THE COUNTY BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEll DAVIS AND WEBER
COUNTY WAS DETERMINED IN THE CASE OF TOONE v.
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY , (DAVIS DISTRICT
COURT CIVIL NO. 20915)
On Page 19 of the Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, it
states there is not a sinsle identical litigant in either
the present case or the Toone v. LeGrande Johnson case.

The

judgment in the .I..QQn.g_ case (R. 106-107), should readily cisclose that Davis County, Davis County Commission, Davis
County Assessor, Davis County Recorder and Robert Rees and
Marie Grow Dansie, his wife, were all parties to that
action as well as the present one before this Court.
It becomes interesting at this point to speculate if
.I..QQn.g_

had prevailed in his case, whether the present Plain-

tiffs-Appellants would be arguing that the

case is not

dispositive as to the validity of the tax sale in question,
It would seem logical that Plaintiffs-Appellants would then
be arguing res judicata, estoppel and judicial notice so
that they would not have to re-try the same issues that were
tr ii:·d in the

case.

The important factor at this time for this Court to
consider is that all of the tax sale purchasers derived
their title from the original tax sale and tax deed from
Davis County (R, 100), and were dependent upon the property
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in question being situate in Davis County.
One of the facts this Court should consider is that the
present Plaintiffs-Appellants were given notice of the pendency of the

action.

(R. 103, 104, 106, 107)

In

fact, as early as November of 1976, the present PlaintiffAppellant, Ron Baxter, as well as the Davis County Recorder, Davis County Assessor, and Robert Dansie were
as witnesses who would testify on behalf of the Plaintiff in
the

case.

(See attached Exhibit "I")

It must be

noted that although the Respondent, Davis County now joins
in opposing the Plaintiffs-Appellants' appeal, that it,
along with Dansie, OFposed the Respondent, Utah Department
of Transportation in the trial of the

case.

One of the most important facts that emerges from the
is that the Respondent, Davis County
changed its plat maps, tax records and refunded any prior
taxes the Plaintiffs-Appellants may have paid on the six
acres in question.

(R. 108, 1C9, 110)

The foregoing was

done during the year of 1977, and yet the Plaintiff-Appellants failed to state any cause of action in its Complaint
against the Respondent, Davis County.

(R. 1, 2, 3)

The Re-

spondent, Davis County then recognized that thE six

in

dispute was located in Weber County and consequentli, the
tax sale deed under which the Plaintiffs-Appellants

-14-

their title was void and invalid ab initio.
On Page 21 of the Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, they
cite the procedure for changing county lines.
is totally inapplicable.

There was no intent to change any

boundary lines, but rather the
establish where in fact,

The citation

case only served to

the county line was between Davis

and Weber Counties.
Generally,

to raise the defense of res judicata, it re-

quires that both actions must involve the same parties,
their privities and the same cause of action.

An exception

exists when a person who was not a party is bound by the reof the first action where the claim he subsequently
brings involves the same issue as adjudicated in the
original action.
estoppel.

This doctrine is known as collateral

Idaho State University y. Mitchel y. Bingham

Mechanical and Metal Products, 97 Idaho 724, 552 P.2d 776
(1976).

The trend of recent cases has approved the fore-

going doctrine.
P.2d 1044

Richards v. Hudson, 26 Utah 2d 1131, 485

(1971).

The Utah Supreme Court in International Resources v.
Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515, 516

(1979)

which underlies the doctrine ...

held that "The principle

[of]

collateral estoppel,

is that when there has been a proper adjudication upon a
controversy, and the Judgment has become final,
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that should

settle the matter and there shculd be no further litigation
thereon."
The general standard to use to

i[ collateral

estorpel can be applied tc a particular case was initially
identified by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard y.
Bank of Affierica Nat'l Trust and Sayings Assoc., 19 Cal.2d
807, 122 P.2d

(1942).

Along with other State Supreme

Courts, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Bernhard standard.

Wildey. Min-Century Ins. Co .• 635 P.2d 417 (Utah

1981); Searle Bros. y. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978).
In Searle Bros. at 691, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In Bernhard y. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Savings Assoc. the California Supreme
Court considered the question of the applicability of res judicata as a basis for applying the collateral estorrel doctrine
identified the following three tests as being detern.inative:
1. Was the issue decided in the
prior adjudication identical
the
one presented in the action in question?
2. Was there a final judgment on
the merits?
3. Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication?
In a subsequent opinion, the California Supreme
Court recognized the necessity fer a fourth test:
"Kas the issue in the first case competentli, fully,
and fairly litigated?" These four tests have been
adopted by the majority of Jurisdictions as the
correct standard to apply.
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Pursuant to the first test of the Bernhard standard,
the issue presented in the instant case is identical cf the
issue presenteC in tbe prior action in Civil

20915.

In

both the prior action and the current action the main issue
was the location of the property in suestion (the entire
cishteen acres), of which six acres is described in the
tax sale deed.

In the prior action in

Civil No. 20915, the jury found that the property in
tion

of

of the

of Section 25, 5 N., 1 W., S.L.M.

containning 18 acres) was and is located in Weber County;
therefore, Cavis County improperly assesseC and scld the
property at the tax sale.
In the prior action in Civil No. 20915 there was a
finc:l JUdgrr:ent on the r.:erits.
test of the Bernhard standard.

'l't.is satisfied the second
In the prior action, wit-

nesses on behalf of both parties testified as tc the
location of the property in question.

The current Appel-

lant, Ronald Baxter, testified on the behalf of the previous
Plaintiff, Toone.

A jury was impaneled and on December 16,

1976, a final judgment against the previous Plaintiff was

enterec}.

(P. 106, 107)

In the instant case, only the Plaintiffs-Appellants
be partiel er in privity

a party to the prior

c.ct1or. u. Civil t:o. 20915 to satisfy tbe thirc.J test of the
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Bernhard

standard.

Mutuality of parties is not essential

in asserting collateral estoppel.

Bernhard.

supra;

.\ii.ld..e

v. Mid-Century Ins. Co •• 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981).
In

Bros .• the Utah Supreme Court provided the

definition of a person in privity.

That Court stated:

The legal definition of a person in
privity with another, is a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes a
mutual or successive relatiooship to rights in
property. Our Court has said that as applied
to judgments or decrees of court, privity means
"one whose interest has been legally presented
at the time." .lQ..... at 691.
Pursuant to the Court's definition of privity in the
Searle Bros. case, the current Appellants are in privity
with the prior Plaintiff in Civil No. 20915 because they
both represent the same legal right,
The current Appellant, Ronald Baxter, along with the
prior Plaintiff, Ronald Toone, and another purchaser, Thomas
Holberg. purchased the property in question at the Davis
County tax sale.

The tax deed stated that the current

Appellant, Ronald Baxter, the prior Plaintiff, Ronald Toone,
and Thomas Holberg (Rio Vista Oil) each owned an undivided
one-third interest in the property in question.

(R, 100)

Rio Vista Oil and the current Appellants, by qu1t-cla1m
deeds, conveyed their interest in the westerly six acres of
the property in question to the prior Plaintiff, Ronald
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Toone.

(R. 113-117)

By quit-claim deeds, Thomas Holberg

(Rio Vista Oil) and the prior Plaintiff, Ronald Toone, conveyed their interest in the middle six acres of the property
(R. 113-118)

in question to the current Appellants.

As shown by the conveyances, the current PlaintiffsAppellants and the prior Plaintiff in the action in Civil
No. 20915 are in privity by purchase concerning the middle
six acres and the westerly six acres of the property in
qeustion, when they purchased the property in question at
the tax sale.

Therefore, pursuant to the Utah Supreme

Court's definition of a person in privity with another, the
current Plaintiffs-Appellants and the prior Plaintiff are so
identified in interest with the same property
the

of Section 25, 5 N. 1

w.,

of

of

S.L.M. containing 18

acres) as to represent the same legal right.
In the prior action in Civil No. 20915, the issue was
the location of the entire 18 acres.

The prior Plaintiff

(Toone), litigated this issue and a final judgment against
him resulted.

The current Plaintiffs-Appellants testified

as an interested witness at that trial.

The current

Plaintiffs-Appellants' interest in the middle six acres of
the property in question has been legally represented in the
action in Civil No. 20915; thus, this satisfied the Court's
definition of privity in Searle Bros.
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Therefore, the

current Plaintiffs-Appellants must be collaterally estopped
from litigating the issue concerning the location of the
property in question.
Pursuant to the fourth test of the Bernhard standard,
the issue as to the location of the property in question in
the prior action in Civil No. 20915 was competently, fully,
and fairly litigated.
In the prior action, there was a jury trial and the
issue was heard on its merits.· The current Plaintiffs-Appellants, Ronald Baxter, was a witness in the prior action;
therefore, he had an opportunity to contest the issue.
Also, the current Plaintiffs-Appellants must feel that the
issue was competently presented because they employed the
same legal counsel as did the prior Plaintiff.

However, the

existence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the
issue in the prior adverse action is not the only criteria
Courts use for the application of collateral estoppel.

The

Court in State Farm Fire & Gas Co. v. Centyry Home Company.
275 Or. 97, 105, 550 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1976), held
that: "The Court must also consider the fairness under all
the circumstances of precluding a party."

That Court

further stated:
Once the court has concluded that the
evidence is sufficient to establish that an
identical issue was actually decided in a
previous action, "prima facie the first judg-20-

ment should be conclusive." The burden then
shifts to the party against whom estoppel is
sought to bring to the court's attention circumstances indicating the absence of a full
and fair opportunity to contest the issue in
the first action or other considerations which
would make the application of preclusion unfair.
Whether the proffered circumstances and considerations warrant a conclusion that the litigant
lacked a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate
the issue and that it would be otherwise "unfair"
to preclude him from contesting the issue again
are likewise questions of law. Collateral
estoppel involves a policy judgment balancing
the interests of the administration of justice,
and this court reserves the final word as to
where the balance is struck in any given case.
lJh. at 105, 1189.
In the instant case, the Court must also consider the
Respondents' burden of relitigating this issue.

If the

Court does not allow the current Plaintiffs-Appellants to be
collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue, the
Court is then allowing the Plaintiffs-Appellants the unfair
opportunity of litigating the same issue twice.

This would

result in a waste of the Court's time, as well as the possibility of inconsistent judgments.
The Court must find, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs-Appellants have had a fair and full opportunity to
contest this issue and that they must be collaterally
estopped from litigating this issue again.

Thus, Summary

Judgment granted in favor of the Respondents should then be
affirmed.
POINT Il.l.
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A PARTY WHO WAS A WITNESS IN A PRIOR ACTION,
FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH ITS CHARACTER AND OBJECT
AND INTERESTED IN ITS RESULTS, IS ESTOPPED
BY THE JUDGMENT AS FULLY AS IF HE HAD BEEN
A PARTY.
It is an undisputed fact that the present PlaintiffsAppellants appeared as an interested witness in the action
of Toone y. LeGrande Johnson Construction Co .• et al .• Civil
No. 20915, and that the Trial Judge in that case was Judge
Calvin Gould.

(R.

128)

Also, as shown in the attached

Exhibit "I", the Plaintiff-Appel[ant, Ronald Baxter, was
listed as one of the Plaintiffs' witnesses in the
case.

In the Plaintiffs-Appellants own affidavit he

readily admits furnishing survey information from his
personal field notes and from government surveys which he
located and described.

All of the foregoing was offered to

establish the location of the Weber River in an attempt to
show that in fact the eighteen acres in question was located
in Davis County.

If the foregoing could have been estab-

lished, then the present Plaintiffs-Appellants would be
making the same arguments as the Defendants-Respondents are
now making.

The current Plaintiff-Appellant, Ronald Baxter,

was ultimately called upon to render an opinion on the location of the Weber River in 1896.

The jury in

case

elected not to believe the current Plaintiff-Appellant,
Ronald Baxter, since they ruled in favor of the Defendants-22-

Respondents' agent, LeGrande Johnson Construction Company in
the .'I.QQD.e case.
The following cases stand for the proposition that
where a person who was a witness in a prior action, fully
acquainted with its character and agent and interested in
the result, and who might have intervened had he so desired,
will be bound by the Judgment.

Briggs y, Madison. 82 P.2d

113 (1938); Terry &Jl.Ll..ghl_of Kentucky y, Crick. 418 s.w. 2d
217 (1967); Security Ins. y. Owen. 501 s.w. 2d 229 (1973);
MQreland y. Meade, 159 Atlantic 101 (1932); Talbot. et al v.
Quaker-State Oil Refining CQ......,_ 104 F.2d 967.
Although this has been mentioned earlier, the current
title to the three six acre parcels is totally dependent
upon the validity of the original tax sale title from Davis
County.

Title to the three tracts of property is dependent

upon a common tax sale title, and upon the existence of the
same set of facts, i.e., the boundary between Davis and
Weber Counties.

Ipsofacto, a prior Judgment entered with

respect to the same subject matter operates as an estoppel
to any right claimed under the original title tax title
wherein the present Plaintiffs-Appellants was listed as a
grantee.

50 C.J.S. Judgments

§

735

road Co. y. U.S .• 168 U.S. 355.
POINT IY
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Pacific Rail

THE COURT MUST TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
ITS PRIOR JUDGMENT IN CIVIL NO. 20915
AND DECLARE THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
TAX DEED IS VOID, AND THUS, AFFIRM SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
The Utah Supreme Court in Carter y. Carter. 563 P.2d
177, 178 (1977) held:
It is true that notice may be taken of
the record of another case.
But for this to
be done it should be so offered in evidence
by a party, or so stated by the trial court,
so that it will be known to them what is being
relied on.
·
Thus, the Trial Court in the instant action must take judicial notice of its earlier judgment in the action in Civil
No. 20915.

(R. 106, 107)

In the prior action in Civil No. 20915, the jury found
the property in question
5 N., 1

w.,

if

of the

S.L.M., containing 18 acres)

located in Weber County.

of Section 25,
is and always was

Subsequently, the Respondent,

Davis County marked its plats and tax records reflecting
that the property in question (the entire 18 acres) was and
is located in Weber County.

(R. 108, 109, 110)

The Respon-

dent, Davis County then abated the taxes which the current
Plaintiffs-Appellants had previously paid and ref used to accept Appellants' checks for any taxes on the property thereafter.

The Davis County Credit Memo,

(R. 108)

reflecting

the abated taxes to the Plaintiffs, stated that the reason
for abatement was "Property was determined to be in Weber
-24-

County by Second District Court.
Davis County."

Error of assessment by

Thus, the Respondent, Davis County, who was

a party in Civil No. 20915, admitted that it had no power to
tax the property in question.

It must follow then that the

tax deed which the Respondent, Davis County issued to the
three tax sale purchasers for the property in question was
void ab initio.
Article 13, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and
Section 59-4-1 of the Utah Code Annotated,

(1953 as amen-

ded), provides that a County may only tax property within
its territorial limits.

The Utah Supreme Court in several

cases has held that a taxing authority is required to follow
procedures prescribed by law with accuracy and particularly
before it can forfeit one's property.

If one step of the

proceeding is invalid, the tax title is invalid.

Salt Lake

v. Coleman. 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974);
v. Peterson. 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246
(1974); Tintic Undine Mining Co. y. Ercanbraclu,. 93 Utah 561,
74 P.2d 1184 (1938).
Therefore, the Court must judicially notice that the
property in question was determined in Civil No. 20915 to be
in Weber County and that Davis County had improperly sold
the property in question at a tax sale.

Thus, the Court

must uphold the Lower Court's ruling that the Plaintiffs-
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Appellants tax title to the property in question is void ab
initio.
The Plaintiffs-Appellants are attempting by this action
to relitigate issues that have already been previously
decided.

The Weber District Court has already litigated the

location of the Weber-Davis County line and the validity of
the tax sale in question.

Presently, neither Weber nor

Davis Counties are now contesting the present location of
the Weber-Davis County line.

The present Plaintiffs-Appel-

lants appeared as an interested witness in the prior proceeding involving the issues set forth above.

To now allow

the Plaintiffs-Appellants to relitigate issues that have already been fully and fairly litigated would make a mockery
of our legal system and the finality of judgments.

Con-

sequently, for the reasons as outlined and set forth above,
these Defendants-Respondents. Utah Department of Transportation, Weber and Davis County, respectfully request this
Court affirm the Judgment of the Lower Court.
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Respectfully submitted this 21st day of June, 1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

c(

WARD
Assistint Attorney

C(c<./(
/

/"

/

STEV-;; C.
Assistant Davis County Attorney

BRENT p. JOHNS /
Weber County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent were mailed first class, postage prepaid, to Glen E. Fuller, 678 East South Temple, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102, this 21st day of June, 1983.

/1
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GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Plaintiff
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: 363-7187
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RONALD A. TOONE,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

LEGRANDE JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant
and Third Party Plaintiff,

PiAINTlFF 'S ANSWERS TO INTERROSA'.

-vs-

Civil No.

20915

ROBERT REES DANSIE and
MARIE GROW DANSIE, his wile;
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
DAVIS COUNTY ASSEssrn' and
DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER,
Third Party Defendants

COMIS NOW

Glen E. Fuller, attorney !or plaintiff

in

the above entitle

action, and representing that he is more fully informed. concerning the 1nformat1c
requested in the Defendant's Interrogatories than is his client, and herewith

answers the Interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY No. 1, State the names and addresses of all witnesses
the plaintiff intends to call at the forthcoming trial,
ANSWER:
Marguente Bourne, Davis County Recorder
Thayne W, Corbridge, Davis County Assessor
Ronald Baxter, 3050 East 3020 Soutr,, Sale 1.,akeClty, Utan
Robert R, Dansie, Third Party Defendant
Earl Kendell, Morgan, Utah
Lee B. Rollins, Morgan, Utah
We have personaJ.ly contacted numerous other md1v1dua1fi in me genera1

area of

Uintah and South Weber, and, depenarng upon the coLUse ot the trial.

